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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Pl ai nti ff-Petitioner, 
-v-
Case No. 20047 
ROBERT PAUL PACHECO, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED IN PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The following issues are presented in this petition for 
rehearing: 
1. Did the Court misapply the holding of Francis y. 
Franklin, U.S. __ , 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985), as analyzed and 
applied in State y. Chambers, Utah, __ P.2d __ , Nos. 19151 and 
19152 (filed October 21. 1985), to the jury instruction 
concerning possession of recently stolen property that was given 
in the instant case? 
2. Did the Court incorrectly hold that admission of 
defendant's post-arrest explanation of his possession of a 
recently stolen ring (i.e., "it may have been there from a 
previous burglary") was prejudicial error because that evidence 
was only relevant to show defendant's propensity to commit a 
crime? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Robert Paul Pacheco, was charged with 
burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony, under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-6-202 119781. A jury found him guilty as charged. The 
court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for a term of 
one to fifteen years and fined him ss,ooo. 
STATC:·lENT Of___EACT_S 
The State agrees witn the fact statement set forth in 
the Court's opinion in State y, Pacheco, Utah, __ P.2d No. 
20047, slip op. at 1-2 (filed October 21, 19 85) <a copy of the 
full opinion is contained in Appendix A), except for that portior 
relating to the content of the jury instruction concerning 
possession of recently stolen property that was given at trial. 
.I_d. at 2-3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
By failing to consider the entire jury instruction 
regarding unsatisfactorily explained possession of recently 
stolen property, as well as other jury instruction given, the 
Court misapplied Francis v. Franklin in holding that the 
possession instruction was unconstitutional. 
In holding that admission of evidence of defendant's 
post-arrest statement explaining his possession of a stolen ring 
was prejudicial error, the Court failed to recognize the 
relevancy of this evidence to the Jury's determination of the 
guilt question and misapplied the relevant rule of evidence. 
I clTRODUCT ION 
In Brown y, Pickard, denying reh'g, 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 
512 (1886), this Court set forth the standard for determining 
whether a petition for rehearing should be granted: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be con·:inced that the court 
failed to consider some material in the 
case, or that it erred in its concl·Jsions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unk;iown 3t t:--ie of the hear1:-:g. 
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4 at 294, 11 P. cit 512 (citation omitted!. In Cummings y, 
lltl:2..QD, 42 lctilh 157, 129 P. 619 (19131, the Court stated: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked · 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result 
If there are some reasons, however, 
such as we have indicated above, or other 
good reasons, a petition for a rehearing 
should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. The argument portion of this 
brief will demonstrate that, based on these standards, the 
State's petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and 
should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE HOLDING OF FRANCIS 
V. FRANKLIN, AS ANALYZED AND APPLIED IN S'.rh.l'..E 
V. CHAMBERS, Itl DECIDING THAT THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION CONCERNING POSSESSION OF RECENTLY 
STOLEN PROPERTY, GIVEN IN THE INSTANT CASE, 
WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In State y, Pacheco, Utah, __ P.2d __ ,No. 20047 
(filed October 21, 19 851 (see Appendix Al, this Court held that, 
based upon its analysis and application of Francis y. Franklin, 
__ U.S. __ , 105 s. Ct. 1965 (19851, in a companion 
·;. 1'bar1oers, 1.'t3h, __ P.2d __ , Nos. 19151 and 19152 (filed 
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. ·' [. 
FJc;i c lu t:ic 
Court's dec1s1on 'N2.:: it:.s _.;1·•-:", 
§ 76-6-402(11 (19781 ,1 someu11ng it t0i.:nd •._,be> 
under Franklin in Chambers, slip op. cit 6-7. flowe•;er, the Cour:, 
for some unexplained reason, failed to consider the instruction 
in its entirety. Instr•_iction No. 15 i:-i ·.ihole read: 
( R. 12 9) • 
The la'" of the state of Utah provides as 
follows: 
"Possession of properti· 
recently stolen, when no satis-
factory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be prima 
facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property." 
Th·Js, if ;·ou find from the e•:idence and 
beyond a reaso:-iable doubt, (l) that the 
defendant ·,,,as i:-i ?OSSession of property, (Ill 
that the property was stolen in a burglary, 
llll) tnat s;,ich oossession was not too remote 
in point of time.from the burglary, and (IV) 
that the defenda:-it had made no satisfactor;· 
explanation of s:.ich possession, then you may 
find from those facts that the defendant 
committed the bu:glary in which such property 
was st o 1 en and st o 1 e the pro pe r t y . 
1:-i deciding whether that instruction is unconstitu-
tional under Frankl1n, the Court must necessaril:/ consider hQ.tl; 
paragraphs of the instr_iction, as well as other instructions 
<;ii·; en to the , 'Jf'i. 
1 Section .... E-6-4C2 1 1; prc·:ijcs: 
FcssessJ..'-!n c: propert:· rec'=nt-2-:: stolen, 
when no of 
tx::.=:: ess::....:::-i 13 '."'."3Ce, s;:.ail :=.:1'.Tla 
f3c e e·J1Je:lcP tne perscn i:-i t:ossess1on 
sto 
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aeneral presented in is the same 
tnat presented in Chambers and Franklin: Did the JUry 
1•Ftr·Jcti•Jn "na·:e the effect of relieving the State of its burden 
of beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential 
dem"nt of a crime." Frankl1n, 105 S. Ct. at 1970 (c1tations 
omitted I. As stated in Franklin: 
The analysis is straightforward. "The 
threshold inquiry in ascertaining the 
constitutional analysis applicable to this 
kind of jury instruction is to determine the 
nature of the presumption it describes." 
l.Q., at 514, 99 s.ct., at 2454. The court 
must determine whether the challenged portion 
of the instruction creates a mandatory 
presumption, see 1._d., at 520-524, 99 S.Ct., 
at 2457-2459, or merely a permissive 
inference, see Ulster Countv Court·;. Allen, 
442 U.S. 140, 157-163, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-
2227, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). A mandatory 
presumption instructs the jury that it must 
infer the presumed fact if the State proves 
certain predicate facts. A permissive 
inference suggests to the jury a possible 
conclusion to be drawn if the State proves 
predicate facts, but does not require the 
jury to draw that conclusion. 
A permissne inference does not relieve the 
State of its burden of persuasion because it 
still requires the State to convince the jury 
that the suggested conclusion should be 
inferred based on the predicate facts proven. 
Such inferences do not necessarily implicate 
the concerns of Sandstrom. A permissive 
inference violates the Due Process Clause 
only if the suggested conclusion is not one 
that reason and common sense justify 1n light 
of the proven facts before the jury. 
Count,· Court. 442 U.S., at 157-163, 99 
S.Ct., at 2224-2227. 
Analys1s must focus init1ally on the 
specif :c challenged. but the inquiry 
dc.os ;)Ot 0 nd there, If a i;xirtion of 
the nc; charge, considered in isolation. 
haVP been understood as 
;:P3tin;i a pres4m.,c1on that relieves the 
-s-
State of its burdPO of ocrsuasion Oll__illl 
ele.'11ent of ao 20tential1'1 
offending words must be 
context of the charge as a whole. 
instructions might explain the particular 
infirm language to the extent that a 
reasonable juror could not have considered 
the charge to have created an unconstitu-
tional presumgtbon. C11pp y, Naughton, 414 
U.S. 141, 147, 94 s.ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 
368 (1973). This analysis "requires careful 
attention to the words actuallv si;x:iken to the 
jury •.. , for whether a defendant has been 
accorded his constitutional rights depends 
upon the in which a reasonable juror 
could have interpreted the instruction. 
442 U.S., at 514, 99 S.Ct., 
at 2545,. 
105 S.Ct. at 1971-72 (emphasis added). When this analysis is 
applied in assessing the validity of Instruction No. 15, it 
becomes clear that a reasonable juror could only have understood 
that instruction to contain a valid permissive inference. First, 
although the first paragraph of the instruction, if considered i:, 
isolation, could reasonably have been understood as creating a 
presumption that relieves the State of its burden of persuasion 
on the elements of burglary, when considered in the context of 
the instruction as a whole, a reasonable juror could not have 
considered that paragraph to have created an unconstitutional 
presumption. The second paragraph, which clearly is stated in 
the for:n of a permissive inference, serves to explain the 
statement of law in the first paragraph. The words "shall be 
deemed prima facie evidence" are not readily understandable to 
the average juror, and, in fact, probably are not particularly 
well understood by many lawyers, as is evidenced by the conf'JSic, 
this Court has experienced with the phrase. 
op. at 7-9. Therefore, a reasonable Juror surelJ' would have reJ, 
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the second paragraph which, significantly, begins with the word 
n t.hus, n as explaining the statement of law in the first 
paragraph. No reasonable juror could have read Instruction No. 
1) as requiring a finding that defendant was guilty of burglary 
once he found beyond a reasonable doubt the enumerated predicate 
facts. Given the wording of the instruction and viewing it as a 
1o1hole, a reasonable juror 1o1ould have understood that he not 
must, find defendant guilty of burglary once satisfied that the 
predicate facts had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.2 This 
conclusion is further supported by examining other instructions 
that 1o1ere given to the jury. Instruction No. 3 read: 
You are instructed that to the 
Information the defendant has entered a plea 
of not guilty. The plea of not guilty denies 
each and all of the essential allegations of 
the charge contained in the Information and 
casts upon the State the burden of proving 
each and all of the essential allegations 
thereof to your satisfaction and beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
(R. 118). Instruction No. 12 read in pertinent part: 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
2 That the instruction's first paragraph is a verbatim recitation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-402(1) (1978) does not automatically 
render the instruction unconstitutional. And, the use of the 
term "prima facie" does not in itself require a finding that 
there is Franklin/Sandstrom error. slip op. at 7-8 
(noting cases 1o1here this Court held that al though the use of the 
term prima facie in an instruction 1o1as improper, it was not 
prejudicial in light of other instructions given to the jury). 
Instruction No. 15 does nothing more than instruct the jury on a 
"traditional common-law inference deeply rooted in our law." 
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973). 
State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44, 45-6 (Utah 1978); State v. 
Kirkham, 20 Utah 2d 44, 432 P.2d 638 (1967) (cases implicitly 
recognizing the validity of this common-law inference in the 
context of approving its use in burglary cases). 
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( R. l 26l • 
defendant is presumed inn0cent until he is 
proved guilty beyond a doubt. And 
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is 
entitled to an acquittal. 
Instruction No. 16 read: 
Before you can convict the defendant of 
the crime of Burglary of a Dwelling as 
charged in the Information on file in this 
case you must believe from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each 
and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 3rd day of 
June, 1983, at 443 East Vine Street, Murray, 
Utah the defendant, Robert Paul Pacheco, 
entered or remained in the dwelling of Masaj i 
and Tsuruko Imai; and 
2. That said defendant did so 
unlawfully; and 
3. That said defendant did so with the 
intent to commit a theft. 
If you are not convinced that the 
evidence establishes each and all of the 
essential elements of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the 
defendant not guilty. If, on the other hand, 
you are convinced of the truth of each and 
every one of the foregoing elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt then you must find the 
defendant guilty of Burglary as charged by 
the Inf orma ti on on file in this case. 
<R. 130). And, perhaps of most significance, was Instruction Ne. 
18, which stated: 
If in these instructions anv rule, 
direction or idea has been in varying 
ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and 
none must be inferred by you. For that 
reason, you are not to single out any certain 
or an:,· 10d1'1idual .,aint or 
instrl.:ct'on. and i;inore the others. but you 
are to cons1::1Pr all tbP iostr·;c+-1<'DS 3.S a 
wholP, and to regard 10 the li;bt of all 
the others. 
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The order in which the instructions are 
gi'len has no si?nificance as to their 
relative imrxirtance. 
: R. l32J ''2.cnphasi s added). 
Second, Instruction No. 15 contains an acceptable 
permissive inference given that "the suggested conclusion is. 
one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven 
facts before the jury." Franklin, 105 S.Ct. at 191. The Supreme 
Court made this clear in Barnes y. United States, 412 U.S. 837 
(1973), which held that an instruction on the common-law 
i.nference of guilty knowledge from the unexplained possession of 
recently stolen property satisfied the requirements of due 
process. l_d. at 841-46. State v Sessions; State v. 
Kirkham at fn. 2) 
Significantly, the Pacheco instructions do not have the 
problems identified by the Court in the instructions it found to 
be unconstitutional in Chambers. There, the verbatim recitation 
of § 76-6-40211) appeared alone, without the explanatory 
paragraph included in Pacheco Instruction No. 15. Chambers, slip 
op. at 4. Fn therrnore, in Chambers a separate instruction 
defined the term prima facie in such a way that it "could well 
have indicated to a juror that the defendants were required to 
disprove guil t"--a defect that could not be cured by another 
instruction that restated the presumption in permissive form. 
l_d. at 6-7. 
In S'1:1, Instruction No. 15 survives the 
anal:,-sis. In applying Franklin, as analyzed 
and applied in C'.Jamt;Prs, to the instant case, the Court failed to 
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take into account the s1gnific3nt :J1fferenCFcS in the 
at issue in and th<' instr,xtion addressed here. 
Consequently, the Court arri':ed at a conclusion that appears to 
be contrary to the law expressed in franklin and Chambers. 
POINT II 
THE COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT THE ADMISSION 
Of TESTIMONY CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S POST- -
ARREST EXPLANATION FOR HIS POSSESSION OF THE 
STOLEN RING WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Pacheco held that the trial court committed prejudicia: 
error in allowing "Detecti'1e Anderson to testify during the 
State's case in chief that defendant had stated in response to a 
question regarding the origin of the ring, '(I]t may have been 
there from a previous burglary.'" Slip op. at 3. In arriving ac 
this conclusion, the Court reasoned that, because the inference 
set out in§ 76-6-402(1) is addressed only to the trial court for 
determining whether the State has established a prima facie case, 
the post-arrest statement of defendant, who did not take the 
stand at trial to offer an explanation for possession of the 
ring, should not have been presented to the jury. Even without 
that evidence "the trial Judge would have been Justified in 
assuming that a prima facie case of burglary had been made out 
against defendant." Pacheco, slip op. 4. Therefore, in the 
Court's view, because the evidence of defendant's statement, 
which included an admission of a prior crime, was "in no way 
• relevant to prove a specific element of the crime of burglar;'" 
and went only to show defendant's ;)[opensity to commit crime, ic: 
admission was prejudicial error. llll_d. This fails to 
recognize the r-=2.·2':3nC' c: c;ia_:lenged to tJrJve 
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J•c! s qull t anrl reflects a critical misapplication of the 
rules of evidence. 
First, the trial court's determination of whether a 
prima facie case has been established under§ 76-6-402(1) and the 
jur/'s determination of the guilt question are two entirely 
different functions. Although the Court correctly concluded that 
defendant's statement, in light of his failure to offer any 
explanation of his possession of the ring at trial, was not 
necessary for satisfaction of the prima facie evidence standard 
applied by the trial court, it incorrectly concluded that the 
evidence was not at all relevant to the issue of guilt presented 
to the jury. The Court's application of Chambers in this regard 
strongly suggests that Jury consideration of unexplained or 
Jnsatisfactorily explained possession of recently stolen 
property, and the inference of guilt that may be drawn from that 
circumstance, is improper. Such a conclusion is contrary to 
established law. BarDPS y, United States, 412 U.S. 837 
119731 .3 A Jury may lawfully and reasonably draw an inference of 
JJcl cc frol'.1 ,xissession of recently stolen property when no 
satisfactorf explanation of that possession is given. 
"Possession of recently stolen property is nothing more than a 
circumstantial bit of evidence in a case of burglary 
SLltP '!. Kirls.han, 20 Utah 2d at 44, 432 P.2d at 638. 
3 The error in this conclusion is fully discussed in the State's 
petit1c" for rehearinj in S,..ate y. Chambers. The State's 
3r·ciur:'.ent there i:c incorp:Hated by reference here (see Appendix 
Bl • 
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Evid. 404(bl !Supp. 1985)5 in h0lding that defendant's statemer.: 
was inadmissible because it was not rele·:ant to prove a specift 
element of burglary and was relevant only to show defendant's 
propensity to commit a crime. s_e.s;: Pacheco, slip op. at 4. R·' 
404(bl provides: 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Like former Utah R. E'lid. 55 (19771, Rule 404 (bl is inclusiona: 
"evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs that is competent and 
relevant to prove some material other than to show merelj' 
the general of the defPndant, is admissible." 
y, Tanner, 675 P. 2d 539, 545 (Utah 1983) (emphasis in origi nali . 
.s..e..e_ i]nited States·:, Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 
1982), 463 l'.S. 1210 (1983). 
4 Under this analysis, presentation by the State of evidence of 
defendant's pretrial explanation for possession of recently 
stolen property is not restricted to those cases where the 
defendant takes the stand and offers a contrary explanation. A 
defendaoit' s unsat1 sLictor:· explanation is most appropriately 
presented as circ·Jmstantial evidence in the State's case-in-
chief. 412 at 839 Sessions, 583 P.2d at 44 
(defendants' explanatory statements admitted in government's 
case- in-chief l. 
5 The c'..lrrent rules of evidence were in effect at the time of 
defendant's trial. 
The State offered defendant's statement only as 
e'.'1dence of his guilt of burglary (i.e., as 
e':ld>:'nce of a lack of le•:ial justification for possession of the 
rinq and an inability to explain satisfactorily that possession), 
Sessions, 583 P.2d at 45-6 <approving of an inference of 
guilt from these circumstances in burglary cases); it was not 
offered to show defendant's propensity to commit a crime (R. 407-
11; Appendix Cl. Defendant voluntarily gave his explanation 
about a prior burglary to the police officer after being arrested 
and after receiving a Miranda warning (R. 40-8; Appendix Cl. 
As an initial matter, the evidence of other misconduct 
contained in defendant's voluntary statement should not be viewed 
as "extrinsic" evidence for purposes of Rule 404 (b). Because the 
evidence of the prior burglary was inextricably intertwined with 
the e'1idence used to prove the crime charged, it was admissible. 
United States y. Mccrary, 699 F.2d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 1983) 
iin prosecution for aiding and abetting introduction of drugs in 
federal prison, evidence of other acts of dealing in drugs in 
prison held "inextricably intertwined" with evidence used to 
prove crime charged). generallv 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence 404[10] at 77-9 <1985). a. United States 
'!. 3lant:rn, 730 F.2d 1425, 1432 <11th Cir. 1984) (evidence of 
other wrongdoing at time of arrest of defendant not inadmissible 
under Rule 404 1 b) because that evidence was "part of the .!..f.S 
:if the offense"'. E'1idence of defendant's explanation was 
critical to the State's case; and, inclusion of defendant's 
reference t'c 2 prior burglary was essential to the jury's 
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understanding of the c·x;::lanat10n and its assessment of whether 
the explanation was satisfactory. 
Even if Rule 404 (b) is applicable, the trial court 
properly admitted defendant's statement. Essentially, a two-st-
test must be met for admission under that rule: ( ll "the 
evidence of an extrinsic offense must be relevant to an issue 
other than the defendant's bad character, n and ( 2) nits probat1·;, 
value must not be substantially outweighed by undue prejudice tc 
the defendant." [Jnited States y, Punch, 722 F.2d 146, 153 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Defendant's statement obviousl1· 
was relevant to show that he had no legal justification for 
possession of the ring and could not give a satisfactory 
explanation for his possession of it. Moreover, the statement 
was relevant to identity and intent. In short, the evidence 
assisted the jury in understanding the cirs,;mstances, and its 
probative value was not outweighed by the possible prejudice to 
defendant • .s.e.e. £..l.lru;,,h, 722 F.2d at 153. 
In conclusion, the following comment by Professor 
Ronald Boyce on this part of the Pacheco opinion is particular!; 
instructive: 
[TJhe Court's ruling on the 
admissibility of defendant's admission is 
wrong in this writer's opinion. The Court 
confuses the value of the evidence as to the 
State's burden to make out a prima facie case 
with the State's burden to prove guilt to the 
satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The question is whether the 
defendant's admission has any relPyance to 
prove his guilt, as distinct from merely 
showing bad character. The admission could 
be interpreted by the Jury as showing 
defendant had no legal Justification for 
possession of the rirq and could not make a 
-14-
reasonable to why the ring was 
in defendant s possession. This evidence, 
although tlnnecessary to the determination of 
a pr ima facie case by the trial judge, is 
relevant to the jury's consideration of 
guilt. Further, the Court is wrong in saying 
before the evidence is admissible it must 
"prove a specific element of the crime." The 
evidence to be admissible under Rule SS, 
U.R.E., 1971, or Rule 404(b), U.R.E., 1983, 
need only have been relevant to any issue in 
the case other than bad character. If the-
evidence was more prejudicial than relevant, 
it should have been excluded under Rule 4S, 
U.R.E., 1971, or Rule 403, U.R.E., 1983. By 
tying the admissibility of the admission to 
the issue of "prima facie" case for the trial 
judge, the Supreme Court has created an 
erroneous, restrictive, and misconceived 
standard of admissibility that will come back 
to haunt it. Any knowledgeable defense 
counsel will use this case to argue that 
evidence of other misconduct, unnecessary to 
establishing the prosecution's prima facie 
case, is inadmissible. This is not the 
proper legal standard for admissibility of 
such evidence. 
Intermountain Commercial Record, Nov. 1, 198S, at 24, col. 1. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it appears that 
the Court in State v. Pacheco, misapprehended significant case 
law in concluding that the jury instruction regarding 
unsatisfactorily explained possession of recently stolen property 
was unconstitutional. Also, the Court applied a wrong principle 
of law in holding that the trial court committed prejudicial 
error when it admitted evidence of defendant's post-arrest 
statement explaining his pcssession of a stolen ring. Therefore, 
the State's petition for rehearing should be granted and the 
instant case should be restored to the calendar for reargument or 
Ut2h R. App. P. 3S(c} (198S). Alternatively, 
-15-
the Court should modify its opinion to reflect a p[ope[ 
application of Franklin v. Francis and Utah R. Ev id, 404 (b), 
The State certifies that this petition is presented ir 
good faith and not for purposes of 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this (:; day of November, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
B. 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and exact copies of the 
foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed to Sumner J. Hatch, 
Attorney for Defendant, 72 East 400 South, Suite 330, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this of November, 1985. 
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ADDENDUM C 
USTRcCT 10:; ::o )-
The mere fact that a in possessir• 
of recentlv stolen propertv is not sufficient to justifv a L 
viction of theft. There of 
tending of themselves to establish guilt However, such ;ioc'.11 
need not be established bv additional evidence or 
warrants a finding of guilty. In this connection vou mav 
···"'··1· 
•Ill •• 
COC· 
you find that the possession under circumstances 
sider the defendant's conduct, anv false or contradictorv 
ments, and any other statements the defendan: mav have made i 
reference to the propertv. If the defendant gives a false a:: 
of ho'.·I he acaui:ced possession of stolen propertv this is a c1: 
stance that mav tend to show guilt. 
In the absence of evidence as to why the defendant 
possession of recentl:: stolen oropertv. ·:ou mav infer that c·•I 
defendant stole the propertv 
